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Abstract—In this paper, we develop a trust based security 
protocol based on a cross-layer approach which attains 
confidentiality and authentication of packets in both routing and 
link layers of MANETs. In the first phase of the protocol, we 
design a trust based packet forwarding scheme for detecting and 
isolating the malicious nodes using the routing layer information. 
It uses trust values to favor packet forwarding by maintaining a 
trust counter for each node. A node is punished or rewarded by 
decreasing or increasing the trust counter. If the trust counter 
value falls below a trust threshold, the corresponding 
intermediate node is marked as malicious. In the next phase of 
the protocol, we provide link-layer security using the CBC-X 
mode of authentication and encryption. By simulation results, we 
show that the proposed cross-layer security protocol achieves 
high packet delivery ratio while attaining low delay and 
overhead. 
Keywords-MANETs; Cross-Layer; Security Protocol; 
Encryption; authentication; Packet Delivery; Overhead. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
A. Mobile Ad-hoc Networks 
A mobile ad-hoc network (MANET) is a temporary 
infrastructure less multi-hop wireless network in which the 
nodes can move arbitrarily.  Such networks extend the limited 
wireless transmission range of each node by multi-hop packet 
forwarding, thus, well suited for the scenarios in which pre 
deployed infrastructure support is not available. In an ad hoc 
network, there is no fixed infrastructure such as base stations 
or mobile switching centers. Mobile nodes that are within each 
other’s radio range communicate directly via wireless links, 
while those that are far apart rely on other nodes to relay 
messages as routers. Node mobility in an ad hoc network 
causes frequent changes of the network topology. Mobile ad 
hoc networks are finding ever increasing applications in both 
military and civilian scenarios due to their self-organizing, 
self-configuring capabilities.  
B. Security Threats in MANETS 
An adhoc network can be attacked from any direction at 
any node which is different from the fixed hardwired networks 
with physical protection at firewall and gateways. Altogether 
it denotes that every node should be equipped to meet an 
attacker directly or indirectly. 
Malicious attack can be initiated from both inside and 
outside of the network. Tracking a specific node is difficult in 
large adhoc networks and hence, it is more dangerous and 
much difficult to detect the attacks from an affected node. 
Altogether it denotes that every node should be prepared to 
work in a way that it should not trust on any node 
immediately.   
Distributed architecture should be applied in order to 
achieve high availability. This is because if the central entity is 
used in the security solution, it causes serious attack on the 
entire network when the centralized entity gets affected.  
The following are the types of active attacks and its 
relevant solutions: 
A. Black hole attack  
Let H be a malicious node. When H receives a Route 
Request, it sends back a Route Reply immediately, which 
constructs the data and can be transmitted by itself with the 
shortest path.  So S receives Route Reply and it is replaced by 
H -> S. Then H receives all the data from S. 
B. Neighbor attack 
The neighbor attack and the black hole attack prevent the 
data from being delivered to the destination. But the neighbor 
attacker does not catch and capture the data packets from the 
source node. It leaves the settings as soon as sending the false 
messages.  
C. Wormhole attack 
Two malicious nodes share a private communication link 
between them. One node captures the traffic information of the 
network and sends them directly to other node. Warm hole can 
eavesdrop the traffic, maliciously drop the packets, and 
perform man-in- the-middle attacks against the network 
protocols. [6].       
D. DoS (Denial of Service) attack 
When the network bandwidth is hacked by a malicious 
node [5], then it results to the DoS attack. In order to utilize 
precious network resources like bandwidth, or to utilize node 
resources like memory or computation power, the attacker 
inserts packets into the network. The specific instances of the 
DoS attack are the routing table overflow attack and energy 
consumption attack. 
E. Information Disclosure attack  
The information disclosure attack aims at the privacy 
requirements of network. The confidential information’s like 
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routing location, node status or secret keys and password are 
leaked out by the malicious node to the unauthorized nodes. 
F. Rushing attack 
The rushing attack aims against on-demand routing 
protocols which uses identical suppression at each node. In 
order to find routed to the destinations, the source nodes sends 
out the RREQ. Each intermediate node processes only the first 
non-duplicate packet and discards any duplicate packet which 
arrives at a later time. Rushing attackers can forward these 
packets quickly by skipping some of the routing processes. 
They are also able gain access to the forwarding group [7].      
G. Jellyfish attack 
A malicious node receives and sends RREQ and RREP 
normally. But before forwarding it delays the data packets 
without any reason for some time [7]. Since the node has to 
intrude the forwarding group first, it is difficult to implement 
this type of attack. If the number of malicious node is few, 
then the influence to the network is also less. 
H. Byzantine attack 
It is also called as impersonation attack because the 
malicious node might imitate another normal node. It also 
sends false routing information for creating an anomaly update 
in the routing table. In addition to this, an attacker may get 
unauthorized admission to resource and sensitive information. 
I. Blackmail attack 
This attack is applicable against routing protocols which 
uses mechanisms for the recognition of malicious nodes and 
broadcast the messages which try to blacklist the offender [8]. 
By adding other legitimate nodes to their blacklists, an 
attacker might blackmail a legitimate node. Thus the nodes 
can be avoided in those routes. 
II. RELATED WORK 
Farooq Anjum et al. [1] have proposed an initial approach 
to detect intrusions in ad hoc networks. Anand Patwardhan et 
al. [2] have proposed a secure routing protocol based on 
AODV over IPv6, further reinforced by a routing protocol-
independent Intrusion Detection and Response system for ad-
hoc networks. Chin-Yang Henry Tseng [3] has proposed a 
complete distributed intrusion detection system has consisted 
of four models for MANETs with formal reasoning.  
Tarag Fahad and Robert Askwith [4] have concentrated on 
the detection phase and they have proposed a mechanism 
Packet Conservation Monitoring Algorithm (PCMA) is used 
to detect selfish nodes in MANETs. Panagiotis Papadimitratos 
and Zygmunt J. Haas[5] have proposed the secure message 
transmission (SMT) protocol and its alternative, the secure 
single-path (SSP) protocol SMT and SSP robustly detect 
transmission failures and continuously configure their 
operation to avoid and tolerate data loss, and to ensure the 
availability of communication. Ernesto Jiménez Caballero [6] 
has reviewed the possible attacks against the routing system, 
some of the IDSs proposed.  
Yanchao Zhang et al. [7] have proposed a credit-based 
Secure Incentive Protocol (SIP) to stimulate cooperation in 
packet forwarding for infrastructure less MANETs. Liu et al. 
[8] have proposed the 2ACK scheme that has served as an 
add-on technique for routing schemes to detect routing 
misbehavior and to mitigate the adverse effect  
Li Zhao and José G. Delgado-Frias [9] have proposed a 
scheme MARS and its enhancement E-MARS to detect 
misbehavior and mitigate adverse effects in ad hoc networks. 
Patwardhan et al. [10] have proposed an approach to secure a 
MANET using a threshold-based intrusion detection system 
and a secure routing protocol.  Madhavi and Tai Hoon Kim 
[11] have proposed a MIDS (Mobile Intrusion Detection 
System) suitable for multi-hop ad-hoc wireless networks, 
which has detected nodes misbehavior, anomalies in packet 
forwarding, such as intermediate nodes dropping or delaying 
packets. 
Syed Rehan Afzal et al. [12] have explored that the 
security problems and attacks in existing routing protocols and 
then they have presented the design and analysis of a  secure 
on-demand routing protocol, called RSRP which confiscated 
the problems mentioned in the existing protocols. In addition, 
RSRP has used a very efficient broadcast authentication 
mechanism which does not require any clock synchronization 
and facilitates instant authentication 
Bhalaji et al. [13] have proposed an approach based on the 
relationship between the nodes to make them to cooperate in 
an ad hoc environment. The trust values of each node in the 
network are calculated by the trust units. The relationship 
estimator has determined the relationship status of the nodes 
by using the calculated trust values. Their proposed enhanced 
protocol was compared with the standard DSR protocol and 
the results are analyzed using the network simulator-2.za  
Kamal Deep Meka et al[14] have proposed a trust based 
framework to improve the security and robustness of adhoc 
network routing protocols. For constructing their trust 
framework they have selected the Ad hoc on demand Distance 
Vector (AODV) which is popular and used widely. Making 
minimum changes for implementing AODV and attaining 
increased level of security and reliability is their goal. Their 
schemes are based on incentives & penalties depending on the 
behavior of network nodes. Their schemes incur minimal 
additional overhead and preserve the lightweight nature of 
AODV.  
Muhammad Mahmudul Islam et al. [15] have presented a 
possible framework of a link level security protocol (LLSP) to 
be deployed in a Suburban Ad-hoc Network (SAHN). They 
have analyzed various security aspects of LLSP to validate its 
effectiveness. To determine LLSP's practicability, they have 
estimated the timing requirement for each authentication 
process. Their initial work has indicated that LLSP is a 
suitable link-level security service for an ad-hoc network 
similar to a SAHN. 
Shiqun Li et al. [16] have explored that the security issues 
of wireless sensor networks, and in particular propose an 
efficient link layer security scheme. To minimize computation 
and communication overheads of the scheme, they have 
designed a lightweight CBC-X mode Encryption/Decryption 
algorithm that attained encryption/decryption and 
authentication all in one. They have also devised a novel 
padding technique, enabling the scheme to achieve zero 
(IJCSIS) International Journal of Computer Science and Information Security, 
Vol. 6, No. 1, 2009
166 http://sites.google.com/site/ijcsis/ 
ISSN 1947-5500
redundancy on sending encrypted/authenticated packets. As a 
result, security operations incur no extra byte in their scheme.  
Stefan Schmidt et al. [17] have proposed security 
architecture for self-organizing mobile wireless sensor 
networks that prevented many attacks these networks are 
exposed to. In addition, it has limited the security impact of 
some attacks that cannot be prevented. They analyzed their 
security architecture and they have showed that it has provided 
the desired security aspects while still being a lightweight 
solution and thus being applicable for self-organizing mobile 
wireless sensor networks. 
III. OBJECTIVES & OVERVIEW OF THE PROPOSED PROTOCOL 
A.  Objectives 
In this paper, we propose to design a Trust-based Cross-
layer Security protocol (TCLS) based on a cross-layer, 
approach which attains confidentiality and authentication of 
packets in routing layer and link layer of MANETs, having the 
following objectives: 
 lightweight in order to considerably extend the 
network lifetime, that necessitates the application of 
ciphers that are computationally efficient like the 
symmetric-key algorithms and cryptographic hash 
functions 
 cooperative for accomplishing  high-level security 
with the aid of mutual collaboration/cooperation 
amidst nodes along with other protocols 
 attack-tolerant to facilitate the network to resist 
attacks and device compromises besides assisting the 
network to heal itself by detecting, recognizing, and 
eliminating the sources of attacks; 
 flexible enough to trade security for energy 
consumption; 
 compatible with the security methodologies and 
services in existence 
 scalable to the rapidly growing network size 
B.  Overview of the Protocol 
We propose a Trust based packet forwarding scheme in 
MANETs without using any centralized infrastructure. It uses 
trust values to favor packet forwarding by maintaining a trust 
counter for each node. A node is punished or rewarded by 
decreasing or increasing the trust counter. Each intermediate 
node marks the packets by adding its hash value and forwards 
the packet towards the destination node. The destination node 
verifies the hash value and check the trust counter value. If the 
hash value is verified, the trust counter is incremented, other 
wise it is decremented. If the trust counter value falls below a 
trust threshold, the corresponding the intermediate node is 
marked as malicious.  
This scheme presents a solution to node selfishness 
without requiring any pre-deployed infrastructure. It is 
independent of any underlying routing protocol. 
We focus on the CBC-X mode Encryption/Decryption 
algorithm to satisfy the necessity of minimum computational 
and communication overhead. This algorithm supports 
encryption/decryption and authentication of packets on a one-
pass operation. The upper layers of the protocol stack are 
provided with security services obviously.  
A CBC-X mode symmetric key mechanism is devised to 
employ our link layer security system. Encryption/Decryption 
and authentication operations are included into a single step 
which reduces the computational overhead to half, instead of 
calculating them individually. The padding technique states 
that this method has no cipher text expansion for the 
transmitted data payload. Thus the communication overhead is 
reduced significantly. 
IV. EFFICIENT MAC LAYER SECURITY PROTOCOL 
A.  Trust Based Forwarding Scheme 
In our proposed protocol, by dynamically calculating the 
nodes trust counter values, the source node can be able to 
select the more trusted routes rather than selecting the shorter 
routes. Our protocol marks and isolates the malicious nodes 
from participating in the network. So the potential damage 
caused by the malicious nodes are reduced.  We make changes 
to the AODV routing protocol. An additional data structure 
called Neighbors’ Trust Counter Table (NTT) is maintained by 
each network node.  
Let ,.....},{ 21 cc TT  be the initial trust counters of the nodes 
,.....},{ 21 nn along the route R1 from a source S to the 
destination D. 
Since the node does not have any information about the 
reliability of its neighbors in the beginning, nodes can neither 
be fully trusted nor be fully distrusted. When a source S want 
to establish a route to the destination D, it send route request 
(RREQ) packets. 
Each node keeps track of the number of packets it has 
forwarded through a route using a forward counter (FC).   
Each time, when node kn  receives a packet from a node in , 
then kn  increases the forward counter of node in  .  
.....2,1,1 =+= i     FCFC ii nn      (1) 
Then the NTT of node kn  is modified with the values of 
inFC . 
Similarly each node determines its NTT and finally the 
packets reach the destination D. 
When the destination D receives the accumulated RREQ 
message, it measures the number of packets received Prec .  
Then it constructs a MAC on Prec  with the key shared by the 
sender and the destination. The RREP contains the source and 
destination ids, The MAC of Prec , the accumulated route 
from the RREQ, which are digitally signed by the destination. 
The RREP is sent towards the source on the reverse route R1.  
Each intermediate node along the reverse route from D to 
S checks the RREP packet to compute success ratio as,  
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PrecFCSR ini /=      (2) 
Where Prec  is the number of packets received at D in 
time interval 1t . The inFC  values of in  can be got from the 
corresponding NTT of the node. The success ratio value iSR  
is then added with the RREP packet. 
The intermediate node then verifies the digital signature of 
the destination node stored in the RREP packet, is valid. If the 
verification fails, then the RREP packet is dropped. Otherwise, 
it is signed by the intermediate node and forwarded to the next 
node in the reverse route. 
When the source S receives the RREP packet, if first 
verifies that the first id of the route stored by the RREP is its 
neighbor. If it is true, then it verifies all the digital signatures 
of the intermediate nodes, in the RREP packet. If all these 
verifications are successful, then the trust counter values of the 
nodes are incremented as 
1δ+= ii TcTc                (3) 
If the verification is failed, then  
1δ−= ii TcTc    (4) 
Where 1δ  is the step value, which can be assigned a small 
fractional value during the simulation experiments. 
After this verification stage, the source S check the success 
ratio values iSR  of the nodes in .  
For any node kn , if minSRSRk < , where minSR  is the 
minimum threshold value, its trust counter value is further 
decremented as 
                    2δ−= ii TcTc                     (5) 
For all the other nodes with minSRSRk > , the trust counter 
values are further incremented as  
2δ+= ii TcTc    (6) 
Where 2δ  is another step value with 12 δδ < . 
For a node kn , if thrk cc TT < , where thrcT  is the trust 
threshold value, then that node is considered and marked as 
malicious.  
If the source does not get the RREP packet for a time 
period of t  seconds, it will be considered as a route breakage 
or failure. Then the route discovery process is initiated by the 
source again. 
The same procedure is repeated for the other routes R2, R3 
etc and either a route without a malicious node or with least 
number of malicious nodes, is selected as the reliable route. 
In this protocol, authentication is performed for route reply 
operation. Also, only nodes which are stored in the current 
route, need to perform these cryptographic computation. So 
the proposed protocol is efficient and more secure.  
B.  CBC-X Mode  
Our proposed link layer security scheme adapts the packet 
format of [16]. But the encryption and decryption mechanisms 
are different.  
It works between the link layer and the radio layer. Our 
proposed method encrypts the data and computes the MAC, 
when the application data payload is passed from the link layer 
to the radio layer. With the help of the radio channel, the 
encrypted message is sent out bit-by-bit. Confidentiality and 
authentication are the of security services which are present in 
our proposed packet format. 
The packet format of the proposed scheme is illustrated in 
Figure.1. The fields of the packet are the destination address 
field, the active message type field, the length field and the 
data field. We keep the one byte group field in the proposed 
scheme to make it general and applicable. We also use a 4 
byte MAC field since it can provide enough security of 
integrity and authenticity for the mobile adhoc networks. Any 
error alteration during message transmission can be detected 
by re-computing the MAC and the error message would be 
discarded to improve efficiency. It uses an 8 byte initial vector 
(IV) and a block cipher mechanism to encrypt the data field of 
the packet. The fixed portions of both IVs are the destination 
address field, the link type field and the length field. These 
fields take 4 bytes totally. 
 
Figure 1. Packet Format 
In our scheme, the generic communication interfaces are 
given to the upper layer and uses the lower radio packet 
interfaces. The nodes in the communication are not conscious 
of the operations on encryption/authentication because the 
security services are given clearly. To make the scheme easier, 
the encryption and authentication for every packet is carried 
out by our default mode in a single pass. In order to finish the 
message authentication and encryption concurrently before 
sending message, we built an authentication and encryption 
scheme called as CBC-X mode.   
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1) CBC-X Mode Operations: 
 
Figure 2. Encryption 
 
Figure 3. Decryption 
The basic steps involved in the encryption and decryption 
operations are illustrated in figure 2 and figure 3 , respectively. 
If the first block has index 1, the formula for CBC 
encryption is IVC     CPEC iiKi =⊕= − 01 ),(         
while the formula for CBC decryption 
is IVC     CCDP iiKi =⊕= − 01 ),)(  
The working of the present CBC mode is described below: 
One cipher text block will be returned for each plaintext block, 
if a part of the plaintext is encrypted. In encryption of the last 
block of the plaintext, one or two cipher text blocks can be 
returned. On the other hand, decryption works in the reverse 
order. Apart from the decryption of the last block, a one 
plaintext block will be returned for each cipher text block. 
After the decryption of the last plaintext block, its padding is 
calculated and cut off, returning a valid plaintext.  
2) CBC Padding Schemes: Plaintext is divided into blocks 
of 8 bytes (64 bits). The final plaintext block must be padded: 
the final a  plaintext bytes 70 ≤≤ a  are followed by a−8  
padding bytes, valued a−8 . 
For example: 
ESP ||'06'||'06'||'06'||'06'||'06'||'06'e2messagebyt || e1messagebyt  
 255  X 1 bytes padding X ≤≤  
 X'||'..||||'03'||'02''01' …  
 
 V. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION 
A. Simulation Model and Parameters 
We use NS2 to simulate our proposed algorithm. In our 
simulation, the channel capacity of mobile hosts is set to the 
same value: 2 Mbps. We use the distributed coordination 
function (DCF) of IEEE 802.11 for wireless LANs as the 
MAC layer protocol. It has the functionality to notify the 
network layer about link breakage. 
In our simulation, 100 mobile nodes move in a 1000 meter 
x 1000 meter square region for 50 seconds simulation time. 
We assume each node moves independently with the same 
average speed. All nodes have the same transmission range of 
250 meters. In our simulation, the speed is varied from 10 m/s 
to 50m/s. The simulated traffic is Constant Bit Rate (CBR).  
Our simulation settings and parameters are summarized in 
table I 
TABLE I.SIMULATION PARAMETERS 
No. of Nodes   100 
Area Size  1000 X 1000 
Mac  802.11 
Radio Range 250m 
Simulation Time  50 sec 
Traffic Source CBR 
Packet Size 512 
Mobility Model Random Way Point 
Speed 10,20,30,40,50m/s  
Pause time 5 
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B.  Performance Metrics 
We evaluate mainly the performance according to the 
following metrics. 
Control overhead: The control overhead is defined as the 
total number of routing control packets normalized by the total 
number of received data packets. 
Average end-to-end delay: The end-to-end-delay is 
averaged over all surviving data packets from the sources to 
the destinations. 
Average Packet Delivery Ratio: It is the ratio of the 
number .of packets received successfully and the total number 
of packets transmitted. 
The simulation results are presented in the next section. We 
compare our TCLS protocol with the LLSP [15] protocol in 
presence of malicious node environment. 
C.  Results 
A. Based On Attackers 
In our First experiment, we vary the no. of misbehaving 
nodes as 5,10,15,20 and 25. 
Attackers Vs Delivery Ratio
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
5 10 15 20 25
Attackers
D
el
ra
tio TCLS
LLSP
 
Figure 4. Attackers Vs Delivery Ratio 
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Figure 5. Attackers Vs Delay 
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Figure 6. Attackers Vs Overhead 
Figure 4 show the results of average packet delivery ratio 
for the misbehaving nodes 5, 10….25 scenario. Clearly our 
TCLS scheme achieves more delivery ratio than the LLSP 
scheme since it has both reliability and security features. 
Figure 5 shows the results of average end-to-end delay for 
the misbehaving nodes 5, 10….25. From the results, we can 
see that TCLS scheme has slightly lower delay than the LLSP 
scheme because of authentication routines. 
Figure 6 shows the results of routing overhead for the 
misbehaving nodes 5, 10….25. From the results, we can see 
that TCLS scheme has less routing overhead than the LLSP 
scheme since it does not involve route re-discovery routines. 
B. Based On Speed 
In our Second experiment, we vary the speed as 
10,20,30,40 and 50, with 5 attackers. 
Speed Vs Delivery Ratio
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Figure 7. Speed Vs Delivery Ratio 
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Figure 8. Speed Vs Delay 
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Figure 9. Speed Vs Overhead 
Figure 7 show the results of average packet delivery ratio 
for the speed 10, 20…50 for the 100 nodes scenario. Clearly 
our TCLS scheme achieves more delivery ratio than the LLSP 
scheme since it has both reliability and security features. 
Figure 8 shows the results of average end-to-end delay for 
the speed10, 20….50. From the results, we can see that TCLS 
scheme has slightly lower delay than the LLSP scheme 
because of authentication routines 
Figure 9 shows the results of routing overhead for the 
speed 10, 20….50. From the results, we can see that TCLS 
scheme has less routing overhead than the LLSP scheme. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
In this paper, we have developed a trust based security 
protocol which attains confidentiality and authentication of 
packets in both routing and link layers of MANETs. In the 
first phase of the protocol, we have designed a trust based 
packet forwarding scheme for detecting and isolating the 
malicious nodes using the routing layer information. It uses 
trust values to favor packet forwarding by maintaining a trust 
counter for each node. A node is punished or rewarded by 
decreasing or increasing the trust counter. If the trust counter 
value falls below a trust threshold, the corresponding 
intermediate node is marked as malicious. In this protocol, 
authentication is performed for route reply operation. Also, 
only nodes which are stored in the current route need to 
perform this cryptographic computation. So the proposed 
protocol is efficient and more secure. This scheme presents a 
solution to node selfishness without requiring any pre-
deployed infrastructure. It is independent of any underlying 
routing protocol.  In the next phase of the protocol, we provide 
link-layer security using the CBC-X mode of authentication 
and encryption. By simulation results, we have shown that the 
proposed cross-layer security protocol achieves high packet 
delivery ratio while attaining low delay and overhead. As a 
future work, we will try to reduce the energy consumption, 
control overhead and delay of our proposed protocol by 
applying some optimization techniques. 
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